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Abstract 
When Bank of England (and the Federal Reserve Board) introduced their quantitative 
easing (QE) operations they emphasised the effects on money and credit, but much of 
their empirical research on the effects of QE focuses on long-term interest rates. We 
use a flow of funds matrix with an independent central bank to show the implications 
of QE and other monetary developments, and argue that the financial crisis, the fiscal 
expansion and QE are likely to have constituted major exogenous shocks to money 
and credit in the UK which could not be digested immediately by the usual adjustment 
mechanisms. We present regressions of a reduced form model which considers the 
growth of nominal spending as determined by the growth of nominal money and other 
variables. These results suggest that money was not important during the Great 
Moderation but has had a much larger role in the period of the crisis and QE. We then 
use these estimates to illustrate the effects of the financial crisis and QE. We conclude 
that it would be useful to incorporate money and/or credit in wider macroeconometric 
models of the UK economy. 
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The original announcement of the decision to start quantitative easing (QE) in the UK 
put it in the context of “the aim of boosting the supply of money and credit and thus 
raising the rate of growth of nominal spending”. In the US, the equivalent 
announcement presented it as  a decision “to help improve conditions in private credit 
markets”.1 Policymakers in each country were also surely well aware of the argument 
(set out in Friedman and Schwartz, 1960) that the money supply had been allowed to 
fall too far in the early 1930s (von Hagen, 2009).  
 
However, the first substantial pieces of research to come out of the Bank of England 
(BoE) and the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) focused on the effect of large scale asset 
purchases on long term bond yields, and made almost no reference to money or credit.  
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) used event study and time-series analysis 
and found that yields on US long term Treasury bonds fell in response to large scale 
asset purchases by 50-100 basis points (in the event study) or 38-82 bps (in the time-
series analysis). Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong (2010) also used event study and 
time-series analysis, and found falls in yields on UK gilts of 50-100 bps. Only later 
did the Bank of England publish articles or papers examining either the effects of QE 
on broad money or the effects of QE on nominal spending or real economic activity 
(Bridges, Rossiter and Thomas, 2011; Joyce et al, 2011; Kapetanios, et al., 2012; 
Bridges and Thomas, 2012). 
 
This paper seeks to investigate whether the growth of broad money might be able to 
help us to understand the nature of the financial crisis and the effects of QE. In a sense, 
it takes its cue from Goodhart (2007, see also 2010), who argued that the neglect of 
money in the dominant New Keynesian and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
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models (Woodford, 2003) – based on assumptions about money demand stability and 
money supply endogeneity – had been taken too far. The quantity of credit has also 
recently been emphasised by Driffill and Miller (2011), who have used the model of 
Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) to argue that the fall in that quantity was a key factor in 
the crisis.2   
 
In the next section we use the once well-known flow of funds framework to discuss 
the mechanics of financial crisis, fiscal expansion and QE. In section 2 we look at the 
relevant data for the UK over the last 3-4 years. In section 3 we report the results of a 
simple reduced-form regression of the relationship between nominal spending growth 
and nominal money growth using interacted dummies for the crisis period. In sections 
4 and 5 we illustrate the striking results of that regression by using appropriate 
counterfactuals to consider what they imply, first for the contribution of the financial 
crisis to the path of spending in 2008-9, and then for the contribution of (the first 
round of) QE in 2009-10. Section 6 concludes by arguing that this investigation 
should be taken further by the introduction of monetary and/or credit aggregates in 
some form into existing large-scale macroeconometric models of the UK. 
 
1 The mechanics of crisis and quantitative easing 
Here we present a simple analysis of the ‘mechanics’ of financial crisis and QE in 
terms of a flow of funds matrix (Table 1) of the kind which used to be included in 
undergraduate macro textbooks (e.g. Artis and Lewis, 1991; Cobham, 1998) but is not 
familiar to the younger generation of macro researchers. 
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In Table 1 the columns represent different sectors of the economy: government, 
central bank, foreign, private non-financial (firms and households), and private 
financial (banks); while the rows represent first the financial deficit (net borrowing) of 
each sector (from the national income accounts) and then the changes in assets 
(positive) and in liabilities (negative) for each financial claim, e.g. deposits, 
government securities. Thus the columns show the balance sheet constraints for each 
sector, while the rows show the supply = demand conditions for each claim: each 
column and each row must sum to zero. This simple presentation makes several 
important simplifications. For example, the central bank and the private financial 
sector are assumed to have no (physical) investment or saving (out of income); 
government securities are held only by domestic agents; non-financial corporate 
equity and bonds are issued and held within the private non-financial sector (so they 
are not visible); and contingent liabilities (derivatives) are not shown because they are 
off balance sheet.3 Moreover, what the table shows is essentially identities rather than 
behaviour. However, this framework is useful because it obliges us to think through 
the ramifications of any change: a change in one sector’s acquisition of a financial 
claim must involve some offsetting change in that column and in that row, and 
typically some further changes as well. 
   [Table 1 near here, circa 1/2 of page] 
 
The identities in the table can be manipulated (and this was often the main purpose of 
the exercise in the past) so as to derive the counterparts to broad money growth:4 
 ∆Ms =DEF-∆GDnf+∆A-∆NDL+∆RES 
where Ms is broad money supply, DEF is the government’s budget deficit, GDnf is the 
amount of government debt held by the private non-financial sector, A is banks’ 
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lending (advances) to the private non-financial sector, NDL is banks’ non-deposit 
liabilities (mainly equity issued by the banks) and RES is the central bank (CB)’s 
foreign exchange reserves. This is broadly the credit counterparts to monetary growth 
as identified, for example, in Table A3.2 of the Bank of England’s Bankstats.5 But the 
flow of funds as a whole goes beyond that insofar as it represents the balance sheet 
constraints of the non-bank sectors as well. 
 
We now consider through this framework the proximate effects of a number of 
exogenous changes, as summarised in table 2; the changes discussed are restricted to 
simple cases where there are ‘single-factor’ offsets, and the analysis focuses on first-
round effects and ignores subsequent portfolio adjustments (many of which take place 
within the private non-financial sector). The first three rows of Table 2 are clear 
enough, but the later rows deserve some comments.6  
   [Table 2 near here, probably whole page in landscape] 
 
 
Row 4 treats the case of a conventional fiscal expansion financed by a bond issue: 
there is an increase in the government’s budget deficit G-T to which we assume there 
is a corresponding fall in the private sector’s deficit I-S (and no change in the current 
account X-Z), together with an issue of bonds by the government. In this simple case 
the private non-financial sector ‘spends’ the additional resources from its increased 
savings/reduced investment on buying the new government bonds. There is no change 
in H or Ms. 
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Row 5 considers a ‘pure’ financial crisis in which banks cut their lending to the 
private non-financial sector. For both sectors the reduction in bank lending is 
balanced by a reduction in deposits. The result is that H is unchanged but Ms falls.  
 
Row 6 is for ‘pure’ quantitative easing: the CB goes into the market and buys 
government bonds from the private non-financial sector. By the time the CB’s cheque 
has passed through the payments system, this brings about an increase in both the 
deposits of the private non-financial sector and the reserves of the commercial banks. 
For the CB the rise in its assets (increased bond holdings) is balanced by the rise in its 
liabilities in the form of banks’ reserves, for the banks the rise in their assets (reserves) 
is balanced by a rise in their deposit liabilities, and for the private non-financial sector 
the fall in bond holdings is balanced by a rise in another asset, their bank deposits. 
The result is that H and Ms both rise. 
 
Row 7 combines a financial crisis/fall in bank lending (as in row 5) with a fiscal 
expansion (as in row 4) of the same magnitude. The private non-financial sector ends 
up with more bonds (to the extent of the fall in its financial deficit), less loans and less 
deposits. The result, which is the sum of the results for rows 4 and 5, is that H is 
unchanged but Ms falls. 
 
Row 8 combines the financial crisis with QE (as in row 6) of the same magnitude: 
here banks’ lending falls but the CB steps in to buy government bonds to the same 
amount, and its purchase of bonds from the private non-financial sector offsets the 
impact of the fall in banks’ lending on the private non-financial sector’s bank deposits. 
For the banks there is a fall in one asset (loans) offset by a rise in another (reserves at 
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the CB). The overall effect (the sum of the effects in rows 5 and 6) is that H rises but 
Ms is unchanged. 
 
Finally, row 9 combines fiscal expansion with QE of the same magnitude. Here the 
government issues bonds to cover its increased budget deficit, and these bonds are in 
effect bought by the private non-financial sector (the independent CB is not allowed 
to participate in the primary government debt market) but then sold immediately to 
the CB. Thus the private non-financial sector, which has a reduced financial deficit 
(corresponding to the increased government budget deficit) ends up with a rise in its 
deposits, while for the banks the increase in deposit liabilities is balanced by a rise in 
reserves at the CB. In total (combining the results of rows 4 and 6), Ms rises (because 
deposits rise) and H rises (because banks’ reserves rise). This is, in effect, the 
standard case of a monetary-financed fiscal expansion. 
 
The key point to take from this discussion is that QE raises the money supply, either 
absolutely (rows 6 and 9) or relative to what would have happened otherwise (row 8). 
In section 4 we also make use of the results that banks’ issues of new equity tend to 
reduce money (row 2), while banks’ acquisitions of government debt tend to increase 
it (row 3). 
 
2 Monetary growth in the UK 2007-10 
It would be useful to fill in the actual numbers for a full flow of funds matrix in recent 
years to examine the evolution of the various aggregates in the UK. But once we 
move from the simple framework above to the specificities of the UK the matrix 
becomes much more complicated, because of the role of foreign financial institutions, 
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the larger number of financial claims and the deep international integration of the UK 
financial sector (foreign sector purchases of government bonds, domestic banks’ 
operations in foreign currency, and so on). However, we can provide numbers for 
various aggregates and for the basic credit counterparts so as to highlight the major 
developments in financial flows since 2007.7  
 
Figure 1 shows the trend decline in the velocity of broad money (measured as 
quarterly nominal GDP divided by M4ex – M4 excluding intermediate OFCs, the 
Bank’s preferred measure of broad money), which was then reversed from 2009 Q2. 
The lines for nominal income and broad money growth (since four quarters before) 
make clear that the last part of the decline reflected a faster fall of nominal income 
than of broad money from mid-2008, while the reversal of the decline reflected the 
rebound of nominal income growth; broad money growth on this four quarter basis 
did not go negative, and began to rise again after 2010 Q1. Figure 1 also includes real 
GDP growth, which is below that of nominal income but moves closely with it, 
especially over the crisis period. 
   [Figure 1 near here, c. 1/3 of page] 
 
Table 3 shows calendar year growth rates for M4ex and its main counterparts (as 
percentage of outstanding M4ex), in the nearest UK-specific form to the basic 
equation given in section 1:8 
 ∆M4ex = ∆M4ex lending to the private sector 
  +    public sector net cash requirement (PSNCR) 
- net private sector purchases of public sector debt 
- public sector external and all other FX transactions 
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- ∆ in MFIs’ net non-deposit liabilities 
+   ∆ in MFIs’ external and all other FX transactions 
+   ∆lending (net of deposits) to intermediate OFCs 
where the second, third and fourth items on the right hand side can be combined in the 
‘public sector contribution’ to monetary growth. The latter is also referred to as net 
sterling lending to the public sector by monetary financial institutions (MFIs), where 
MFIs include the Bank of England so that this includes asset purchases under QE. An 
alternative perspective on these developments is provided by Figure 2, which shows 
the four quarter changes in M4ex and the main credit counterparts from 2004 to 2010 
(all as percentages of M4ex). Three particular points stand out from the table and the 
figure. First, the changes in both M4ex and M4ex lending had been around 7% and 
10% respectively between 2000 and 2004, and then around 10% and 12-15% in 2005 
and 2006, but both fell strongly in 2008 and 2009 to below 2%; M4lending growth 
then went negative for a while, but M4ex growth (on the four quarter basis) remained 
positive but very low. Secondly, the PSNCR (the public sector’s financial deficit) rose 
from around 3-4% in the mid-2000s to 7% in 2009 and 13% in 2009. Thirdly, the 
public sector contribution which had fluctuated around zero rose to nearly 14% of 
M4ex in 2009. Within that aggregate, the Bank of England’s cumulative gilt 
purchases under the Asset Purchase Facility reached in January 2010 the scheduled 
£200bn, equivalent to nearly 13% of M4ex in March 2009 and nearly 14% of nominal 
GDP in 2008. There is also a sharp fluctuation, in opposite directions, in MFIs’ 
externals in 2008 and 2009; this appears to be related to some one-off movement 
around the turn of the 2008/9 year which is also reflected in an unusually large change 
in (sterling) non-deposit liabilities in 2008 Q4.9 Overall, it is clear that the sharp fall 
in broad money growth in the crisis was associated with a sharp fall in lending to the 
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private sector; and the sharp rise in 2009-10 in the public sector’s contribution was 
associated with the rise in the budget deficit, on the one hand, and with QE on the 
other. At the same time  MFIs’ externals and the change in non-deposit liabilities 
fluctuated more widely than usual over the crisis and QE period. 
  [Table 3 near here, probably a whole page in landscape, but half a page 
in portrait if possible; Figure 2 also near here, this may need to be a whole page in 
landscape, but half a page in portrait if it is still clear enough] 
 
The penultimate row in the table shows the numbers available (for M4 rather than 
M4ex) for the twelve months from March 2009 to February 2010, which covers the 
period of QE:10  here the MFIs’ externals are much smaller and, more importantly, it 
is clear that the public sector contribution to monetary growth is very large while 
monetary growth is limited by the negative impact of the large change in non-deposit 
liabilities (this issue is taken up below in section 5). The final row shows the data for 
the counterparts from July 2009 (when monthly data first become available) to 
January 2010: again it is clear that the public sector contribution is very large (but is 
offset by a large change in non-deposit liabilities). 
 
Figure 3 shows the financial surpluses/deficits of different sectors. In the early years 
the foreign sector has a consistent surplus (i.e. there is a current account deficit) and 
that continues with little change over 2008, 2009 and 2010. On the other hand the 
general government’s deficit increases in 2008 and even more strongly in 2009, and 
falls slightly in 2010. The private sector has corresponding movements in its financial 
surplus; disaggregated data make clear that the main changes arise in the household 
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sector, whose surplus increased very strongly in 2009, while non-financial and 
financial corporations experienced a rise and a fall respectively in 2010. 
 [Figures 3 and 4 near here, c. 1/3 of a page together] 
 
Finally, Figure 4 shows new issuance by private non-financial corporations (quarterly 
and over the four preceding quarters). The series fluctuates widely but it is clear that 
there were exceptional levels of issuance in 2009-10.  
 
The fiscal expansion, the financial crisis (in terms of its impact on bank lending) and 
QE are all substantial changes to the counterparts of broad money growth over 2008-
10. The fiscal expansion clearly originates outside the monetary sphere, in the 
combination of the financial crisis, the sharp cyclical downturn and the discretionary 
measures taken to mitigate the recession by the Labour government. The financial 
crisis, with the problems of bad debts, on the one hand, and the freezing of the 
interbank market, on the other, led to a very sharp fall in bank lending: the careful 
examination by Bell and Young (2010) of the balance between credit supply side 
factors and loan demand factors finds that credit supply effects were dominant, that is 
banks were deciding to lend less.11 And QE itself was the result of a policy decision 
taken by the MPC (in coordination with the government) in the light of the crisis and 
the recession. These changes are not, therefore, the automatic response of the 
monetary system to the shocks affecting it, they were the result of specific decisions 
taken by specific agents (who could have taken different decisions). In that sense 
these changes can be regarded as exogenous to the monetary system. Moreover, they 
are substantial enough not to be washed away in the short term through the usual 
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adjustment mechanisms that allow monetary growth in more tranquil periods to be 
reasonably viewed as endogenous. 
 
This suggests that it would be useful to investigate whether we can use broad money 
directly (in a reduced form equation) to analyse the course of UK GDP over the crisis. 
If a clear relationship is found this might make it possible to get a better grip of what 
would have happened to nominal spending first in the absence of the financial crisis, 
and then in the absence of QE, by simulating the effects of different levels of 
monetary growth. First, however, we examine the relationship between nominal 
spending growth and broad money growth. 
 
3 The relationship between nominal spending growth and broad money 
growth 
In this section we investigate whether it is possible to explain the four-quarter growth 
rate of nominal GDP (the growth since four quarters before) on the basis of the four 
quarter growth rate of nominal money and other variables. We use four quarter 
growth rates in order to concentrate on ‘medium term’ effects and to abstract from 
short run noise. 12  Given that there is no obvious up-to-date reduced-form (or 
structural) model that we can pluck off the shelf to analyse this relationship, we 
approach it as follows. First, we draw on the forward-looking Taylor rule literature in 
choosing as regressors the variables typically used to forecast inflation and the output 
gap in standard GMM estimations (see, for example, Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998), 
together with the nominal money growth rate. Second, we use the automatic 
econometric model selection procedure within PC-Give (formerly known as PC-
GETS) to select the variables and the lags. 
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The measure of broad money is the Bank of England’s recently introduced preferred 
measure, M4 excluding intermediate OFCs. This measure is only available since 1997 
Q4, so we use the four-quarter growth rate of M4 as broad money growth before 1998 
Q4. Figure 1 above shows the four quarter growth rates of nominal GDP and nominal 
money on this basis, together with the corresponding growth rate for real GDP. The 
independent variables we consider are lagged nominal GDP growth, the annual 
growth rate of the world commodity price index, Bank Rate and nominal money 
growth. We consider up to 4 lags of each variable.13  
 
Since, as set out in the previous section, there is a suspicion that money may have 
been subject to extraordinary supply-side shocks in the last few years which might 
have changed the underlying relationships, we estimate this equation with interacted 
dummy variables for M4 growth and Bank rate: the dummy is defined as zero up to 
2007 Q2 and 1 thereafter, and it is interacted with each of the four lags of these two 
variables. 
 
The results of the regression are reported in the first column of Table 4. For the period 
as a whole, the automatic selection programme in PC-Give selects only the lagged 
dependent variable (lagged one period), nominal money growth (lagged three periods) 
with a rather small but significant coefficient, and commodity price inflation (lagged 
three periods), but not Bank Rate. However, the interacted dummy variables covering 
only the period from 2007 Q3 turn out to be very important: money growth (lagged 
two periods) has a significant coefficient of 0.70, and Bank Rate (lagged four periods) 
has a significant coefficient of -1.49. This coefficient on monetary growth is less than 
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the 1 that might be expected from a simple quantity theory model (with constant 
velocity), but given the medium rather than long-term focus of the analysis it is 
impressively large. The coefficient on lagged Bank Rate is also strikingly high: it 
implies that a rise of 1% in Bank Rate leads in four quarters to a 1.49% fall in the rate 
of nominal GDP growth. The lags – given that money growth is since four quarters 
before – are broadly consistent with a priori expectations and, in the case of Bank 
Rate, with the Bank of England’s BEQM model.  
  [Table 4 near here, c. 1/2 of page] 
 
The exercise is repeated in equation [2] for real GDP growth against real M4 growth. 
The latter is calculated using the GDP deflator, so the conversion is the same as for 
nominal GDP, but the other variables – commodity price inflation and Bank Rate – 
are unchanged between the regressions. The results are broadly the same. Here a 
second term in GDP growth (lagged four periods) is significant, and Bank Rate has a 
small but significant negative coefficient for the period as a whole. For the later 
period the interacted variables for money growth and Bank Rate both have smaller 
(than in [1]) but still highly significant coefficients. 
 
These results were obtained from a naïve reduced form single-equation regression, 
which does not consider directly, for example, variables representing world economic 
activity or domestic fiscal policy and in which the lagged dependent variable is very 
important. However, the fact that the same broad pattern of results – small  roles for 
Bank rate and money growth in the 1994-2007 period, but negative and significant 
coefficients on Bank rate and positive and significant coefficients on money growth in  
the later period – is found if real GDP growth is taken as the dependent variable with 
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real money growth as the regressor, or even if real GDP growth is made dependent on 
nominal money growth,14 suggests that the finding is robust.  
 
Overall, these results are consistent with the proposition that money has a significant 
role in explaining nominal spending growth in the periods which include the crisis 
and QE, but little such role in the tranquil pre-crisis period; and they are consistent 
with Goodhart’s (2007) argument that money may sometimes provide no additional 
useful information beyond that provided by inflation, output and interest rates, but in 
other periods money might tell us more, so that in general it should be monitored 
rather than ignored. In the next two sections we use the results of regression [1] to 
illustrate the magnitude of the impact monetary developments might have had on the 
economy, first for the downturn in bank lending in the crisis period of 2007-8 and 
then for the QE period of 2009-10. 
 
4 The effect on nominal income of the collapse of bank lending 
We have already referred to the work of Bell and Young (2010), which found that 
there were significant supply-side factors in the downturn of bank lending to the 
private non-financial sector during the crisis. On that basis we suggest that an 
appropriate counterfactual A for what would have happened if there had been no 
financial crisis is that (nominal) M4ex lending would have continued through 2008 to 
2009 Q4 at a ‘normal’ rate. Given that the evolution of M4ex over this period was 
dominated by and very close to that of M4ex lending (see Figure 1), we make this 
operational by simply assuming that the four quarter growth rate of M4ex does not 
fall below its average of 6.48% in 1998-2004 (which omits the period of faster growth 
in 2005-7). Thus on counterfactual A M4ex growth in 2008 Q1 is at the historical rate 
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of 8.3% and in the following seven quarters it is 6.48%, as against the historical 
values of 6.6, 4.3, 3.7, 4.4, 3.1, 1.9, 1.0 and 0.8%. The actual and counterfactual paths 
for the four quarter growth rate of nominal money are shown in Figure 5. We then use 
the coefficient estimates from regression [1], the predicted values of the lagged 
growth rate, the counterfactual values for money growth and the actual values of 
commodity price inflation and Bank Rate, to calculate what the nominal GDP growth 
rate would have been under the counterfactual rate of money growth.  
   [Table 5 near here, c. 1/3 of page] 
   [Figures 5 and 6 near here, c. 1/3 of page] 
 
Table 5 gives the definition of the counterfactual and Figure 6 shows the actual path 
of the growth rate, and that predicted under counterfactual A (with the actual values 
of the independent variables up to 2008 Q1). It suggests that nominal spending growth 
would have been much higher if bank lending had not collapsed in the way that it did 
during the financial crisis: growth falls to a low of only -1.8% in the first half of 2009, 
as opposed to the actual trough of -5.5%, and by the end of 2009 it is picking up 
strongly. The high rates of growth reached in 2010 also reflect the cuts in Bank Rate 
in 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1 (which might not have been needed if the financial crisis had 
not occurred). For this reason amongst others the counterfactual should be regarded as 
suggestive rather than a precise estimate. 
 
5 The effect on nominal income of QE 
We now turn to assess the impact of quantitative easing on nominal GDP growth, 
given the occurrence of the financial crisis, by constructing a counterfactual path for 
monetary growth. Given the complexity of the issue and the various offsets to QE 
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which have been identified by Bridges et al. (2011) (see also Bridges and Thomas, 
2012), we construct three different counterfactuals (see also Table 5 above). First, if 
there were no offsets to QE at all, then M4ex in the absence of QE would have been 
lower by the cumulative amount of the asset purchases: in this counterfactual B 
money growth falls much faster than the historical series, turning negative in 2009 Q2, 
reaching -11.6% in 2009 Q3 but then returning towards the historical series as QE 
begins to fall out of the four quarter interval during 2010. 
 
Second, there is an important offset highlighted by Bridges et al. (2011): the effect of 
‘banking sector stabilisation’ in the form of (a) banks’ issuance of new equity and 
bonds which raises their non-deposit liabilities and reduces their deposits (see row 2 
in Table 2), and (b) banks’ acquisition of additional public sector debt in order to 
improve their liquidity ratios, which increases their deposits (see row 3 of Table 2). It 
is likely that some banking sector stabilisation of these kinds would have occurred in 
the absence of QE, since banks needed to improve their capital ratios after the 
revelation of large housing-related bad debts. But it could be argued that the 
stabilisation was facilitated by QE: QE meant that ‘other financial corporations’ 
(OFCs), notably pension funds and life assurance companies, which had sold their 
gilts to the BoE now had extra resources to invest, and this may have encouraged 
banks to issue new paper. We therefore construct a counterfactual C under which 
nominal money was lower by the amount of the ‘excess’ lending by MFIs to the 
public sector (which includes both QE and commercial banks’ purchases of gilts), net 
of the ‘excess’ increase in MFIs’ non-deposit liabilities, where the excess is the 
deviation from the respective averages for 1997 Q4 to 2007 Q4. 
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Third, Bridges et al. (2011) have also raised the issue of private non-financial 
corporate issuance. Here the argument is that PNFCs may have been issuing more 
equity and bonds over the QE period because OFCs were willing to buy, as with bank 
issuance, but this might reduce the PNFCs’ demand for credit and hence their 
borrowing from banks, in which case the stock of M4ex lending and M4ex itself 
would be lower by the (cumulative) amount of PNFC issuance. We therefore 
construct a final counterfactual D by adding to the nominal M4ex implied by 
counterfactual C the amount of PNFC issuance from 2009 Q2 in excess of the average 
issuance from 2003 Q1 to 2008 Q4 (the period for which the data are available on the 
Bank’s website).  
 
The paths of nominal money growth under these counterfactuals are shown in Figure 
7. Counterfactual B implies the largest effect from QE, counterfactual C a smaller 
effect and counterfactual D an even smaller effect. As stated above there is evidence 
that the fall in bank lending was more of a supply-side phenomenon. To the extent 
that the fall was supply-driven then additional PNFC issuance would be providing 
firms with additional resources without reducing the amount of firms’ borrowings 
from the banks, so the size of the offset would be smaller. It is also arguable that 
much of the banking sector stabilisation would have taken place, necessarily, even in 
the absence of QE. So while counterfactual D can be regarded as the lower bound 
(and it is close to the lower bound suggested by Bridges et al., 2011), it seems likely 
that the ‘true’ counterfactual would involve a somewhat larger fall in nominal money 
growth, somewhere between counterfactuals B and D. It should also be noted that 
there is a sharp jump in nominal money in 2010 Q1 under counterfactuals C and D. 
This is the result of an exceptionally large rise in banks’ non-deposit liabilities in that 
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quarter, followed by a fall in 2010 Q2, and of the fact that the assumptions defining 
the counterfactuals are taken to hold beyond the end of QE (in January 2010). This 
means that for these two counterfactuals more weight should probably be attached to 
the results for 2009 than for the later quarters. 
   [Figures 7 and 8 near here, c. 1/3 of page] 
 
These counterfactuals are then used to find what the nominal GDP growth rate would 
have been in the absence of QE, as understood in each case. Figure 8 shows the actual 
path and those predicted under counterfactuals B, C and D. In each case the difference 
between the actual and the counterfactual paths of nominal GDP can be interpreted as 
a (rough and suggestive) estimate of the effect of QE under the relevant assumptions. 
On counterfactual B, that is if no QE was undertaken and there were no offsets to it, 
growth falls heavily to a trough of -13.8% in 2010 Q3, before turning up. On 
counterfactuals C and D, where there are assumed to be varying offsets, growth 
improves from 2009 Q3 but becomes positive only in 2010 Q3 and 2010 Q4 
respectively, whereas actual (and predicted) nominal spending growth rose above zero 
in 2010 Q1. The implication is that in the absence of QE nominal spending growth 
would have been considerably weaker for longer. In other words QE did indeed have 
a significant impact on nominal spending and hence economic activity in the UK. 
 
A recent article in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin (Joyce et al. 2011) has reported a 
number of estimates of the peak effect of QE on real GDP and CPI inflation taken 
from ongoing research at the Bank: the range for GDP is 1.5-2%, and that for CPI 
inflation is 0.75-1.5%. If we take the sum of these to be a reasonable estimate of the 
change in nominal GDP, this comes to around 3%. In Figure 10, the difference in the 
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four quarter nominal GDP growth rates as of 2010 Q1 (the QE period) between the 
predicted rate and the rate on counterfactual D (which implies the smallest impact of 
QE) is also of the order of 3%, while the differences with counterfactuals C and B are 
around 4.8% and 10.6%. On the other hand, our corresponding estimates of the peak 
effects are 4.6 and 7.2% for the four quarters to 2010 Q2 on counterfactuals D and C, 
and 18.2% for 2010 Q3 on counterfactual B. Thus our estimates for the effect of QE 
are typically a little higher than those reported by the Bank, particularly if the ‘true’ 
counterfactual is agreed to be somewhere between B and D, as argued above. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Formal announcements of the introduction of quantitative easing emphasised the 
intended impact on money and credit and hence on nominal spending, but the main 
empirical research published by the leading QE-undertaking central banks focuses 
instead on the effects of QE on long-term interest rates rather than money or credit. In 
this paper we have tried to see whether there is a direct connection between nominal 
spending growth and monetary growth, which we argue is very likely to have been 
significantly affected by the financial crisis and quantitative easing. Our approach can 
be thought of as covering the range of possible transmission mechanisms, as set out in 
e.g. Benford et al. (2009), and connecting money with the object of ultimate interest, 
nominal spending, rather than say long-term interest rates. The results we have 
obtained should be treated as tentative, since they have been derived using a simple ad 
hoc reduced form equation rather than a more comprehensive model, and since we 
can only give a range of counterfactuals on different assumptions. Nevertheless, they 
suggest strongly that changes in money have had a considerable impact on the 
economy in the last few years, and a much greater impact than in the pre-crisis period. 
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This is consistent with the idea that in tranquil times money may not embody 
significant additional information, but that in other periods changes in banks’ 
behaviour may affect money, credit, nominal spending and the real economy. 
Moreover, they imply that QE has indeed had a major impact on the UK economy, 
and a somewhat larger impact on our analysis than that reported by the Bank of 
England. 
 
For this period at least broad money would indeed appear to tell us something, enough 
to suggest that more research would be appropriate. We do not think further insights 
can be gained by working on simple reduced form models, but we suggest that 
operators of large macroeconometric models of the UK economy, notably the Bank of 
England, should experiment with the inclusion of monetary and credit variables in 
their models. The Bank’s (published) monitoring of money and credit could also be 
deepened.15 
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Notes
 
1  For the UK See the press statement of 5 March 2009, at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/019.htm, and the Minutes of 
the MPC meeting at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf. 
For the US see the press statement of 18 March 2009, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090318a.htm. An earlier 
paper setting out the idea of quantitative easing had referred to it as “buying or selling 
securities to affect the overall supply of reserves and the money stock” (Bernanke and 
Reinhart, 2004:87). 
2 Another paper which calls for the re-integration of money into macro modelling is 
Chadha, Corrado and Holly (2008): we are grateful to a referee for drawing this to our 
attention. 
3 In contrast to earlier versions of the matrix, here the government and central bank 
are treated separately, in the light of the modern focus on central bank independence 
and the need to locate QE within that context. 
4 To derive this, write each of the private non-financial column, the financial deficit 
row and the overseas column as equations: 
(I-S)+∆D+∆NDL+∆C+∆GDnf = ∆A+K  [A]  
DEF + (X-Z) + (I-S) = 0    [B]  
(X-Z) + K = ∆RES     [C]   
then substitute for I-S in [A] from [B], and for X-Z from [C] and use the definition 
∆Ms=∆D+∆C. 
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5  This view of the credit counterparts to broad money growth goes back to the 
changes in monetary statistics made in the UK in the late 1960s. See Goodhart (1989, 
part 6) and Cobham (1991). 
6 In the discussion that follows we talk of rises or falls in assets and liabilities, but 
strictly the changes are rises or falls in the flows into assets and liabilities, i.e. changes 
relative to whatever else is happening. 
7 The monetary data are from the Bank of England’s interactive statistical database, 
and GDP and  financial deficit data from the Office of National Statistics.  
8 We are grateful to Ross Meader at the Bank of England for explanation of some of 
the details of the credit counterparts of M4ex. See also Kirkham and Davies (2011). 
9 We are grateful to Jonathan Bridges and Ryland Thomas at the Bank of England for 
clarification on this point. 
10 Monthly data (seasonally adjusted or otherwise) are available for M4ex and M4ex 
lending only from July 2009. We use twelve months rather than the eleven over which 
QE took place and non-seasonally adjusted data because the basic counterparts 
relationship does not hold for the seasonally adjusted data. 
11 More precisely they conclude that “the evidence discussed in this article suggests a 
significant role for a persistent tightening in the supply of credit, independent of 
changes in credit quality and Bank Rate… Credit demand is also likely to have 
weakened during the recession…” (Bell and Young, 2010: 319). See also the study by 
Aiyar (2011) on the transmission of shocks to banks’ external funding through to their 
domestic UK lending. Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2001) find for a large sample 
of EU and US banks that bank-specific characteristics such as banks’ Tier 1 capital 
ratios affected their behaviour in the face of the crisis. 
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12  This also means that for the monetary data, where the seasonal adjustment 
procedures are still under discussion (Hussain and Maitland-Smith, 2010; Gilhooly 
and Hussain, 2010), we can reasonably use non-adjusted data.  
13 We also experimented with US and euro area output gaps, but this did not produce 
satisfactory results. 
14 In this case there is a significant positive coefficient on Bank Rate for the overall 
period, but this is more than offset by significant negative values on the interacted 
dummy variables for Bank Rate (lagged two and four periods), and there is a 
significant positive coefficient on nominal money of 0.56. 
15 It is noticeable that the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, for example, contains a more 
substantial analysis of money and credit than the Bank of England’s Inflation Report, 
while the Bank of England also has no parallel to the large-scale macroeconometric 
model of Giannone et al. (2009), which provides the basis for their (2011) estimates 
of the effect of the ECB’s non-standard policy measures.  
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Table 1: Simplified flow of funds matrix  
 government central 
bank 
overseas private 
non-fin 
private 
financial 
total 
1) fin def G-T  X-Z I-S  0 
2) deposits    ∆D -∆D 0 
3) non-deposit 
liabilities 
   ∆NDL -∆NDL 0 
4) high-
powered 
money 
 -∆H  ∆C ∆R 0 
5) government 
securities 
-∆GD ∆GDcb  ∆GDnf ∆GDf 0 
6) CB lending 
to banks 
 ∆CBL   -∆CBL 0 
7) domestic 
lending 
   -∆A ∆A 0 
8) foreign 
lending 
 ∆RES K-∆RES -K  0 
total 0 0 0 0 0  
 
Notes: G-T, X- Z (Z for imports) and I-S are the standard sectoral financial deficits as 
in the national income accounts; D and NDL are bank deposits and bank non-deposit 
liabilities respectively; H, C and R are high-powered money, notes and coin in 
circulation and banks’ reserves at the central bank; GD, GDcb, GDnf and GDf are the 
stock of government debt (securities) in existence, and the amounts held by the central 
bank, private non-financial and private financial sectors respectively; CBL is short 
term lending from central bank to commercial banks, i.e. ‘money market assistance’; 
A is bank lending (advances); K is capital inflows, and RES is the foreign exchange 
reserves. The change in high-powered money is equal to the change in notes and coin 
in circulation (∆C) plus the change in banks’ reserves at the central bank (∆R). The 
change in broad money is equal to the change in  notes and coin in circulation (∆C) 
plus the change in deposits (∆D).  
 
Table 2: Effects on the flow of funds 
 Exogenous change proximate ramifications effect 
on H 
effect 
on Ms 
1 standard CB refinancing of banks: increase in 
CBL 
∆CBL↑, ∆H↑, ∆R↑; banks get increased liability (CBL) but 
increased asset in form of additional reserves at CB (R) 
rise no 
change 
2 issuance of new equity and bonds by banks, 
bought by private non-financial sector 
∆NDL↑, ∆D↓; private non-financial sector has less bank deposits but 
more bank paper, banks have less deposit but more non-deposit 
liabilities 
no 
change 
fall 
3 banks buy government bonds (to improve own 
liquidity) from private non-financial sector 
∆GDnf↓, ∆GDf↑, ∆D↑; banks have more government bonds but 
more deposit liabilities, private non-financial sector has less bonds 
but more deposits 
no 
change 
rise 
4 fiscal expansion (with equivalent fall in private 
sector financial deficit) financed by bond issue 
bought by private non-financial sector 
G-T↑, I-S↓, ∆GD↑, ∆GDnf↑; private non-financial sector buys 
newly issued bonds with its extra financial resources 
no 
change 
no 
change 
5 ‘pure’ financial crisis: banks reduce their 
lending 
∆A↓, ∆D↓; equivalent reduction in bank lending and deposits 
affecting both financial and non-financial sectors (in opposite ways) 
no 
change 
fall 
6 ‘pure’ QE: CB purchases government bonds 
from private non-financial sector 
∆GDcb↑, ∆GDnf↓, ∆D↑, ∆R↑; rise in private non-financial sector’s 
deposits (balancing fall in its bonds), rise in banks’ reserves at CB 
(offsetting rise in their deposit liabilities) 
rise rise 
7 financial crisis plus fiscal expansion financed 
by bond issue bought by private non-financial 
sector 
G-T↑, I-S↓, ∆GD↑, ∆GDnf↑,∆A↓, ∆D↓; private non-financial sector 
has more bonds (to the amount of the fall in I-S), less loans and less 
deposits [sum of rows 4 and 5] 
no 
change 
fall 
8 financial crisis plus QE: bank lending falls but 
CB buys more bonds to same extent 
∆A↓, ∆GDcb↑, ∆GDnf↓, ∆R↑; private non-financial sector has less 
loans but also less bonds and its deposits remain unchanged, banks 
have less loans but more reserves at CB [sum of rows 5 and 6] 
rise no 
change 
9 fiscal expansion plus QE: government issues 
new bonds which are then purchased by CB 
G-T↑, I-S↓, ∆GD↑, ∆GDcb↑, ∆D↑, ∆R↑; private non-financial 
sector has lower financial deficit and higher deposits, banks have rise 
in reserves [sum of rows 4 and 6] 
rise rise 
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Table 3: Changes in M4ex and counterparts (as percentage of outstanding M4ex) 
year ∆M4ex 
lending 
Public sector 
net cash 
requirement 
Private sector 
purchases of 
public sector 
debt (-) 
Public sector 
external and 
all other FX 
transactions 
Public 
sector 
contribution  
∆MFIs’ 
external and 
all other FX 
transactions 
∆ in net non-
deposit 
liabilities (-) 
Net lending 
to 
intermediate 
OFCs 
∆M4ex 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2000 12.84 -4.60 1.64 0.45 -2.54 0.90 -3.88 0.48 7.91 
2001 8.87 -0.23 0.81 0.45 1.02 -2.50 -1.25 0.13 6.28 
2002 10.12 1.97 -0.97 0.26 1.26 -2.74 -2.74 0.93 6.83 
2003 11.72 3.79 -3.14 -1.37 -0.72 -2.77 -2.08 0.46 6.60 
2004 12.41 4.00 -3.09 -0.24 0.67 0.41 -6.42 0.38 7.41 
2005 12.37 3.67 -1.02 -2.74 -0.08 2.99 -3.54 -1.87 9.87 
2006 15.50 2.73 -1.69 -2.70 -1.66 -0.07 -2.41 -1.31 10.06 
2007 8.98 2.40 -0.07 -2.93 -0.61 -2.73 -0.68 5.42 10.37 
2008 1.97 7.19 -3.75 -2.65 0.80 9.93 -13.74 4.72 3.70 
2009 -0.42 12.94 1.91 -1.16 13.68 -10.92 -0.08 -1.31 0.95 
2010 -1.07 10.17 -2.34 -5.09 2.74 3.21 -3.71 1.48 2.65 
2011 2.00 7.62 -1.26 -2.02 4.34 -0.12 -5.07 0.10 1.25 
          
Mar09-
Feb10* 
n.a. 
(2.15) 
13.20 1.82 -0.84 14.18 -0.66 -10.67 n.a. n.a. 
(5.00) 
Jul09-
Feb10** 
-1.05 8.19 2.01 -2.01 8.19 2.08 -8.75 -1.16 -0.69 
Notes: MFIs are monetary and financial institutions (essentially banks, building societies and the Bank of England); relationship between 
columns: 5 = 2 + 3 + 4;  9 = 1  + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8; * numbers in brackets in this row refer to M4 and M4 lending, because M4ex and M4ex lending 
are available on a monthly basis only from July 2009, and all numbers in this row are percentages of M4ex outstanding at end-2008 Q4; ** July 
2009 to February 2010 only, data not seasonally adjusted, and all numbers are percentages of M4ex outstanding end-2008 Q4. 
Source: calculated from Bank of England interactive statistical database. 
Table 4: PC-Give autometrics estimation 
Dependent variable: nominal GDP growth / real GDP growth 
Sample period: 1994 Q1 to 2010 Q4 
 
 [1]: nominal [2]: real 
   
Constant 2.29* 
(0.32) 
1.31** 
0.13 
GDP growth (-1) 0.51** 
(0.06) 
(-1) 
0.79** 
0.05 
GDP growth (-4)  -0.21** 
(0.03) 
M4 growth (-3) 0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Bank Rate    (-3)  -0.01** 
(0.004) 
commodity price inflation (-2)  -0.01** 
(0.003) 
commodity price inflation (-3) -0.01** 
(0.004) 
 
M4growth  (-2)*dum 0.70** 
(0.11) 
0.47** 
(0.06) 
Bank Rate (-4)*dum -1.49** 
(0.18) 
-0.74** 
(0.08) 
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.97 
   
AR 1-5 test:       F(5,57) 0.83090 [0.5331] 0.98108 [0.4373] 
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,60) 0.85417 [0.4967] 0.28612 [0.8859] 
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) 1.6718 [0.4335] 2.2232 [0.3290] 
Hetero test:        F(10,57) 2.5113 [0.0141]* 0.49697 [0.8850] 
Hetero-X test:    F(20,47) 1.5412 [0.1118] 0.57136 [0.9130] 
RESET23 test:   F(2,60) 1.5422 [0.2223] 1.6169 [0.2070] 
AR 1-5 test:       F(5,57) 0.83090 [0.5331] 0.98108 [0.4373] 
 
Notes: growth of GDP or money is growth since four quarters before; equation [1] has 
nominal GDP growth as the dependent variable and nominal M4ex growth among the 
independent variables, equation [2] has real GDP growth as the dependent variable 
and real M4 growth among the independent variables; standard errors are in brackets;  
** significant at the 1% confidence level; * significant at the 5% confidence level. 
 
Table 5: The counterfactuals  
 purpose of counterfactual implementation 
A to identify broad money growth in absence of financial crisis-
induced cut in bank lending 
broad money growth does not fall below its average for 1998Q4 to 
2004Q2, i.e. 6.48% 
B to identify broad money growth in absence of quantitative easing broad money level set equal to actual minus cumulative asset 
purchases under APF 
C to identify broad money growth in absence of QE but taking 
account of offsets from (a) rise in non-deposit liabilities (=> 
Ms↓) and (b) banks’ purchases of public sector debt (=> Ms↑) 
broad money set equal to actual plus excess of change in MFIs’ net 
sterling assets (over average for 1997Q4-2007Q4) minus excess of 
MFIs’ lending to public sector (over average for 1997Q4-2007Q4)  
D to identify broad money growth in absence of QE but taking 
account of offsets from (a) rise in non-deposit liabilities (=> 
Ms↓), (b) banks’ purchases of public sector debt (=> Ms↑) and 
(c) increased issuance by PNFCs (=> bank lending↓ and Ms↓) 
broad money set as in counterfactual C plus excess of PNFCs’ issuance 
(over average for 2003Q1-2008Q4) 
 
Note: the offsets are calculated from 2009 Q1 to the end of 2010, except for that for the non-deposit liabilities which starts in 2009 Q2 (because 
there are very high and largely offsetting variations in that series for 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1, and given that QE started only in March 2009 it is 
unlikely that significant QE-related issuance by banks occurred in 2009 Q1).  
 
Figure 1: Velocity, nominal income growth and broad money growth 
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Figure 2: Four quarter changes in M4ex and counterparts (% of M4ex) 
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Source: data from Bank of England interactive statistical database 
Figure 3: Financial surpluses/deficits by sector (% of GDP)  
 
Source: ONS website 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Issuance by private non-financial corporations 
 
Source: BoE. 
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Figure 5: Monetary growth under counterfactual A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Nominal GDP growth under counterfactual A 
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Figure 7: Money growth under counterfactuals B, C and D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Nominal GDP growth under counterfactuals B, C and D 
 
 
 
 
